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Devin Vaughn
Slavery as a Political Tool: The Battle over Kansas
The decades leading to the Civil War were marked by an
increase in political combat between the North and the South over
the question of slavery. Territorial expansion and the admittance
of new states greatly intensified this battle, causing legislators to
argue over the question of whether or not slavery would be allowed
to continue westward. In the decade preceding the Civil War, the
struggle over the admission of Kansas as a state embodied the
South’s attempts to utilize the institution of slavery as a political tool
to aid in this battle. Southern political forces went to great lengths
in their attempt to admit Kansas as a slave state, hoping that the
newly created state would increase the South’s political potency.
There is much to be considered when defining the “South,”
given its geographic, economic, political, and cultural diversity.
This paper will utilize slavery as a means of determining southern
identity, because the institution had geographic, economic,
political, and cultural implications. The official slave states by 1860
were Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.1 These fifteen states were
what comprised the South as a factional entity.
Comparatively, the North was a less united entity. Its free
workforce was a less systematized economic configuration and
therefore required less centralization. As a result, the formation
of the North as its own entity was due less to a uniting internal
aspect, like slavery, and more to a reaction against an external
aspect; the South’s political prowess. The official free states by
1860 were California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Wisconsin.2 These eighteen states were what comprised the
North as a factional entity.
An important factor in comparing the South and the North is
the breakdown of their populations and how those populations
were represented in Congress. The Three-Fifths Compromise,
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which allowed three out of every five slaves to be factored into
the population represented in Congress, was established at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 and allowed the lesser populated
slaves states to stand up against the North’s superior population;
and, for many years, the Three-Fifths Compromise leveled the
sectional playing field in Congress.3 Unfortunately for southern
interests, the North’s population grew at a far greater rate.
In 1790, the South had a total population of 1,961,372 people
(free and enslaved), while the North had a population of 1,968,455
people.4 But following the War of 1812, millions of immigrants
poured into the country, most of them into northern port cities
like New York and Boston. Meanwhile, many Americans in both
the South and the North moved westward into the territories,
which was a concern for the South, because its population was
not being replenished by European immigration.5 As a result,
by 1850, the South was populated by 9,612,769 people (free and
enslaved), while the North was populated by 13,434,922 people.
When one detracts the value of the South’s 3,200,304 slaves, its
free population is revealed to have been 6,412,465; but in terms of
political representation, as a result of the Three-Fifths Compromise,
approximately 1,920,182 of the slaves were counted as freemen,
giving the South an adjusted free population of 8,332,647 people.
In comparing the South’s adjusted free population to the North’s
population, one finds that the North still had 5,102,275 more people
than the South in 1850. That difference represented roughly sixtyone percent of the South’s adjusted free population. Without the
Three-Fifths Compromise, the difference would have been roughly
110 percent. However, despite the North’s far greater populace, the
South stretched over more land, occupying 851,448 square miles,
while the North occupied 612,597 square miles, meaning the South
controlled roughly fifty-eight percent of the total area of the United
States, excluding the territories.6
The Three-Fifths Compromise would also greatly alter the
Electoral College. In 1852, the South had 120 electoral votes, and
the North had 176 electoral votes. Had the electoral votes not taken
into account three-fifths of the slaves, the numbers would have
been 105 and 191, respectively, thus giving the North even greater
representation.7 One can clearly see the political advantage the
Three-Fifths Compromise afforded the South.
Even with this advantage, the North still would have politically
overpowered the South much earlier had the political system
predating the presidential election of 1860 been purely sectional.
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Fortunately for southern interests, the political system since the
time of John Adams’ presidency had been a non-sectional two-party
system, with various political parties taking active, dualistic roles.
As a result of the non-sectional party system, sectional issues were
less troublesome because voters could channel their sectional anger
into a less divisive, non-sectional system capable of compromise.8
From 1836 to 1852, the Whig-Democrat party system dominated
presidential politics.9 It was under this system that the Slave Power
would have its last era of dominance, being able to manipulate the
party system in its favor.
The term “Slave Power” is used in this paper to describe an oligarchy
of slaveholders who acted in varying forms of unison to control state
and national politics to favor their interests. The idea of such a class of
men in the United States, trying to limit federal power to favor their
own interests, had existed since the debate over the ratification of the
Constitution in 1787. Alexander Hamilton, in advocating ratification,
wrote of such men, stating their intentions to limit the power of the
federal government and describing their desire as:
the perverted ambition of another class of men, who
will either hope to aggrandise [sic] themselves by the
confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves
with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision
of the empire into several partial confederacies, than
from its union under one government.10
Though Hamilton did not specifically name the “Slave Power,” he
outlined its objective: to make itself more powerful at the cost of the
federal government.
In 1850, the number of slaveholders in the South was 346,048;
and, of that number, 92,215 owned ten or more slaves. This was a
rather small figure in relation to the overall size of the South, but the
influence of this class was great. Furthermore, the majority of the
South’s economy was derived from agriculture. In 1850, the value
of the South’s agricultural product was $631,277,417, whereas the
value of the product of its manufactures was $165,413,027. In the
field of agriculture, 3,697,649 people were employed; of that figure,
2,500,000 of them were slaves. This means that sixty-eight percent
of those who worked in the most profitable field of the southern
economy were slaves.11 Consequently, slaveholders controlled
more than two-thirds of the workforce in the largest sector of the
South’s economy. This figure taken separately (assuming that each
agricultural worker produced the same amount of product) was
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larger than the remainder of the value of the agricultural product
combined with the value of the industrial product. When one
combines the data of the agricultural and industrial products,
slaveholders employed in agriculture were directly responsible for
at least fifty-three percent of the South’s overall economic product,
meaning that the slaveholders were clearly the most important
figures in the South’s economy.
Another important factor in determining the influence of
slaveholders can be found in data concerning how political discourse
might have been circulated. Census data relating to urbanization,
education, the press, and transportation gives a context to the Slave
Power’s potential to control the southern populace.
Given the lack of an accessible national media, local institutions
influenced most voters.12 In the South, most institutions of political
influence were fewer and more disparate than in the North.
Cities, for example, were important cultural centers for circulating
political debate; but the South was home to very few large cities.
In fact, in 1856, census data revealed that there was “less than fifty
cities with a population of 3,500” in the South.13 This meant that
southerners were less likely to have strong, nearby cultural centers
of political discourse. In relation to education, a strong means by
which political debate is advanced, the South had only 18,507
public schools to the North’s 62,433; and only 152 public libraries
to the North’s 1,058. Illiteracy was also high in the South. In 1850,
512,882 illiterate white people lived in the South, or roughly seven
percent of the total white population, assuming that the figure
representing the number of slaves in the total population remained
constant. Also, in 1850, there were 454 political periodicals in the
South with a circulation of 413,265 (a figure very close to the number
of slaveholders.) Comparatively, the North had 1,160 political
periodicals with a circulation of 1,394,582. And another important
means of circulating political discourse was transportation. In 1854,
the South had 4,212 miles of railroads to the North’s 13,105, and
1,116 miles of canals to the North’s 3,682.14
If one takes all of this information together, one can see that
the methods by which political discourse was circulated in the
South were minimal and more likely to have been controlled by
regional influences, giving much more power to local leaders. Since
slaveholders controlled the largest portion of the economy, it can be
reasonably assumed that they were able to take advantage of their
influential positions and guide their regional masses in a manner
that would have been less imaginable in the North.
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By whatever method, though representing only a small fraction
of the population, slaveholders and their interests were well
represented in government. In the executive branch, between the
presidencies of Thomas Jefferson and James Monroe, the state
of Virginia held sway over the presidency for nearly a quarter
century; and, prior to the presidency of Abraham Lincoln, the only
presidents to ever serve more than one term (Washington, Jefferson,
Madison, Monroe, and Jackson) were slaveholders. In addition, of
the fifteen presidents before Lincoln, nine of them were from the
South. Many more slaveholders served in Congress, including
those who served as Speaker of the House the longest (Henry Clay,
Andrew Stevenson, and Nathaniel Macon.) In the judicial branch,
the South maintained a strong advantage, as nineteen of the thirtyfour Supreme Court Justices before Lincoln were slaveholders.15
Considering the South’s relatively small population when compared
to the North, one would assume that the South would not have had
such clout in government, but the South was able to maintain great
power preceding the Civil War because of its political savvy.
The South’s ability to maintain its strength existed in its ability
to manipulate northerners. On May 26, 1854, William Seward, a
Whig senator from New York, addressed the Senate regarding the
upcoming passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. He spoke of the
South’s ability to maintain its power:
The great support of Slavery in the South has been
its alliance with the Democratic Party of the North.
By means of that alliance it obtained paramount
influence in this Government about the year 1800
which, from that time to this, with but few and slight
interruptions, it has maintained.16
The Democratic Party, since the time of Andrew Jackson,
required a presidential candidate to have the backing of at least
a two-thirds majority of the nominating caucus; and because the
South was such an integral element of the party, it would have been
impossible for a Democratic presidential candidate to receive the
party’s backing if he were at odds with the South. Consequently, if
a northern Democrat were to have any hope of success in the party,
he would have to back the southern agenda.17 As a result, the South
more or less controlled the Democratic Party on the national level.
This organization allowed the South to always fend off threats
in Congress. For example, if a bill were presented to Congress
opposing the interests of the Slave Power, its un-amended passage
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would have been highly unlikely, given that opposition to the bill
would have included the entire South (both Whigs and Democrats)
and the northern wing of the Democratic Party. In fact, for many
years, the only real opposition to the South as a whole was northern
Whigs.
This acquiescence, on the part of northern Democrats, made
possible the passage of such bills catering to southern interests
as the admission of Arkansas as a slave state in 1819, the Indian
Removal Act of 1830, and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. As time
wore on, however, the South found it more difficult to rely on
support from northern Democrats because their staunch support
for the South caused them to lose elections. Meanwhile, some
northern Democrats felt that they were not adequately profiting
from their support for the South since northerners could seldom
gain a great deal of power in the Democratic Party.18 Consequently,
by the time the Kansas-Nebraska Bill came to Congress in 1854,
the South was in a politically weaker position than it had been in
previous decades.
The admittance of new states had long been a difficult subject
in antebellum politics. For many years preceding the Civil War,
the number of slave states had remained equal to the number of
free states. If a new slave state was admitted, it was coupled with a
new free state, and vice versa. For example, Alabama offset Illinois;
Missouri offset Maine; and Arkansas offset Michigan. By this
method, a certain level of sectional equality was maintained in the
Senate.19
This delicate balance, however, would be undone. As a result
of the gold rush of 1849, many Americans flocked to California in
search of wealth. The influx of so many people required a territorial
government, and Californians drew up a constitution prohibiting
slavery. Many of those mining gold wanted to keep slavery out of
California, due to racism and fear that slaveholders would take
over the mining industry as they had the agricultural industry in
the South. As a result, California was admitted as a free state in
1850.20
The admittance of California destroyed the balance between
the South and the North in the Senate. Consequently, as the 1850s
began, there were fifteen slave states and sixteen free states,
meaning the balance in the Senate was thirty and thirty-two,
respectively.21 Though the South could often count on the votes
of northern Democrats, the idea of this new imbalance prompted
efforts to reestablish balance in the Senate.
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Meanwhile, in the early 1850s, Congress was pressured to
officially organize the remainder of the Louisiana Purchase to
allow for settlers. Stephen A. Douglas, a Democratic senator
from Illinois serving as the chairman of the Senate Committee on
Territories, brought forward a bill in early 1854 organizing the
territories of Kansas and Nebraska. Prior to this bill, the Missouri
Compromise of 1820 had been used to determine the expansion
of slavery in the territories. The Compromise stated that slavery
would not be allowed in the territories north of the 36°30’ parallel
line (the southern border of Missouri.) This statute was intended
as a concession to the South from the North, but more than three
decades after its passage, the Slave Power was no longer satisfied.
In a move to draw southern Democratic support, Douglas
overturned the Compromise of 1820 with his new bill, the KansasNebraska Act, which voided the 36°30’ parallel line and stipulated
that the people of the territories would decide for themselves
the question of slavery via popular sovereignty. As a result of
overturning the longstanding Compromise of 1820, the KansasNebraska Act would prove to be very divisive. Many southerners
welcomed the bill because it potentially opened up the West for
slavery, but many northerners found in it more reason to reaffirm
their belief in the existence of the Slave Power controlling national
affairs.22
When William Seward addressed the Senate in late May of 1854,
he had no illusions about the outcome of the Kansas-Nebraska Act.
Referencing the bill’s approaching passage, he lamented, “The sun
has set for the last time upon the guarantied [sic] and certain liberties
of all the unsettled and unorganized portions of the American
continent that lie within the jurisdiction of the United States.” He
went on to point at the “political equilibrium between the free and
the slave States,” indicating that the bill could destroy it, giving the
South more power and influence over the North. Though Seward’s
opening statements seem particularly dejected from a northern
perspective, his tone would change when speaking of the future.23
Fear is what Seward described as the motivating factor in the
South’s support of the Kansas-Nebraska Act: “Slavery, wherever
it exists, begets fear, and fear is the parent of weakness. . . . It is
the apprehension that, even if safe now, they [the slave states]
will not always or long be secure against some invasion or some
aggression from the free States.” A primary factor in the fear
described by Seward was the increasing political potency of the
North. As aforementioned, by 1850, the North’s population was
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greater than the South’s adjusted free population by 5,102,275
people which figures to be sixty-one percent of the South’s adjusted
free population. Seward cited European immigration as being a
primary factor in this force of population that would eventually
make slavery obsolete.24
Earlier that same year, in the House, the Kansas-Nebraska Act
was dividing some southern congressman, sparking disagreements
over the meaning of the 1820 Missouri Compromise. Alexander
H. Stephens, a Democratic congressman from Georgia, stated
that the 1820 Compromise had been only a compact between the
federal government and the state of Missouri, and that the slaveryprohibiting effect of the 36°30’ parallel line did not stretch outside
of Missouri, meaning that slavery was free to be established in
any of the United States’ territories. He also stated that the North
did not respect the line, as many northern congressmen voted
against the admission of Arkansas as a slave state, even though
it fell below the line. Citing what he implied to be hypocrisy
and dishonesty on the North’s part, he felt that the South had no
obligation to respect the Compromise of 1820. He went further to
identify the northern threat. His reasoning implied, if the North
could legislate slavery out of the territories, it could possibly do
the same to the South in the future, should it gain the political
support of the new states. He made clear his desire to give slavery
a chance in the West via popular sovereignty.25
Theodore G. Hunt, a Whig congressman from Louisiana,
refuted some of Stephens’s claims in his speech. He stated that the
repeal of the Missouri Compromise of 1820 would be a dangerous
precedent. It would destroy the good faith in the negotiations and
compromises made previously between the South and the North.
He also stated that the Missouri Compromise was a “southern
measure carried by southern votes,” in that many southerners
voted in its favor, it respected southern interests, and it created
peace between the South and the North. Ultimately, the negation of
the Compromise would potentially make any laws or agreements
on the books in relation to slavery open to repeal.26
With this in mind, Hunt said, “And now, I would ask, what
motive has the South to extend the area of slavery within the
present limits of the Republic?” Hunt had stated that much of
the western territory was unsuitable for southern cash crops that
had been used to warrant slavery in the first place. “Why then,”
he continued, “this lust for new lands not wanted and not capable
of being used?” Hunt would answer his own question: “There
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are those who desire that the slaveholding States should acquire
additional territory, in the belief or hope of effecting and preserving
a balance or equilibrium between them and the non-slaveholding
States. But this is a vain and delusive hope.”27
Hunt’s assertions implied that the Slave Power sought to
continue slavery into new areas of the country, where much of
the land would not be hospitable to the institution, for the sake of
political gain. In much of the western territory, slavery would not
have been of value economically as much as it would have been
politically because once slavery was imbedded in a state, that
state’s society would come to generally revolve around it, therein
creating an increase in power and influence for slaveholders. As a
result, slavery created a comparatively centralized political system
by means of a collective interest based around slaveholders that
extended across all slave states. In this sense, the Slave Power was
adverse to the South’s championed system of politics: states’ rights.
Nineteenth-century historian Henry Adams explained the
actions of the Slave Power in relation to its supposed support of
states’ rights:
Whenever a question arose of extending or protecting
slavery, the slaveholders became friends of centralized power, and used that dangerous weapon
with a kind of frenzy. Slavery in fact required
centralization in order to maintain and protect itself, but it required to control a centralized machine;
it needed despotic principles of government, but it
needed them exclusively for its own use.28
Had states’ rights been the real issue in southern politics,
Douglas would not have opposed the Mormon settlers’ sanctioning
of polygamy in the Utah territory, given the fact it was the popular
decision of the citizens of that territory.29 Also, the South’s passage of
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which more or less forced northerners
to participate in catching fugitive slaves, was hardly an example of
states’ rights, seeing as it forced northerners to support laws they
did not endorse. In short, southern politics did not operate on the
idea of states’ rights; it operated on the idea of what was best for
the Slave Power.
In 1856, the Democratic Party tried to put a bill through
Congress bringing in Kansas as a state under the aegis of popular
sovereignty; that is, allowing the people of the state to decide on
the issue of slavery. However, as the southern rhetoric developed,
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it highlighted the importance of slavery to the South more than it
championed the idea of states’ rights. In the bill, the Democrats
deferred guilt on the issue of slavery by stating, “We shall not
undertake to determine why the God of nature made the African
inferior to the white man; or why He permitted England to fasten
the institution of slavery upon the colonies against their repeated
and earnest remonstrances.” They then added that any attempt by
the government to revoke slavery would be in opposition to the
Constitution and the political system of states’ rights which the
Democrats implied was the modus operandi from the nation’s
beginning.30 In this argument, the South covered its real intent to
expand slavery and shrouded its arguments with support for the
Constitution and states’ rights, as well as economic factors.
Conversely, John Allison, a Whig congressman from
Pennsylvania, attacked the bill and spoke of the question of
slavery’s expansion:
I represent a constituency whom to say nothing of the
question of humanity, are interested in this question
— interested because it is the overshadowing
moneyed interest of this country — controlling
its Government, dictating its legislation. The vast
amount of capital invested in slave property, together
with other causes, renders it the most vigilant and
sensitive interest ever known to any country.
He would continue to denounce the expansion of slavery
as an economic and political weight on the country, as well as a
moral weight, adverse to the nation’s principles.31 His statements
recognized the political expediency of slavery and how its westward
expansion would have further affected national politics.
James A. Stewart, a Democratic congressman from Maryland,
through supporting slavery and its westward expansion, verified
its strong influence on the economy and politics. He stated, “Such
a scheme [abolition] would be utterly destructive to the negro race,
and in its results would occasion a fearful paralysis in all departments
of trade everywhere, from which, galvanism, nor all the restoratives
within reach, could save you.” Stewart then tried to turn the tables on
the North by stating that the South and the West were natural allies,
capable of making the North obsolete. By Stewart’s implication, the
North was fearful and dependent of the South.32
Stewart’s implications were weakened by Judah P. Benjamin, a
Democratic senator from Louisiana, who maintained an aura of fear
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in regards to the North. Benjamin focused more upon the political
advantages the North would have if Kansas were simply allowed
to be a free state, theorizing that the North would eventually be
able to take a decisive political majority and alienate the South from
power. He stressed the necessity of keeping a political balance:
Sir, in every case where the framers of the
constitution foresaw any temptation which could
induce a majority from one section of the Union to
legislate for their own exclusive advantage, they
have expressly prohibited such an abuse in order to
preserve equality between the States.
He continued by stating that the majority of the South’s
economy was agricultural and that slaves formed the majority of
the agricultural workforce. If slavery were to be excluded from
the territories, the South would be economically castrated there.
Benjamin then identified what he thought to be the reason behind
the North’s refusal to adopt the bill:
The motive is a struggle for power — for political
power — for the chance of subverting that equality
of the States to which I have adverted . . . The
object is to attain such power as shall put these
parties in possession of sufficient representation,
in both branches of Congress, to change the
federal constitution, and to deprive the South of
that representation which is already inadequate to
protect her rights. 33
When looking back over the statements of the legislators in
relation to this bill, it is interesting to note how much of the focus
was upon slavery, its importance to the South, and the ramifications
of its prohibition in the West, as opposed to what was supposed
to be the official issue behind the bill: states’ rights. The southern
legislators glossed over the idea of states’ rights, veering their
arguments more toward protecting slavery, determinedly focusing
on its expansion. As aforementioned, the South was less concerned
with states’ rights and popular sovereignty, focusing on issues more
immediate to the Slave Power.
The bill failed to pass. By the time the Democrats tried to push
it through Congress in 1856, the United States’ political climate
had changed. The old non-sectional Whig-Democrat party system
was on its last legs. Replacing the Whigs in the two-party system
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were the Republicans; and in the presidential election of 1856, it
was made clear that the Whig party was a thing of the past. The
Democratic candidate, James Buchanan, won the election, scoring
45.3 percent of the popular vote with a total of nineteen states in
his pocket and 174 electoral votes; the Republican candidate, John
C. Frémont, scored 33.1 percent of the popular vote with a total of
eleven states in his pocket and 114 electoral votes; and the WhigAmerican candidate, Millard Filmore, scored only 21.5 percent
of the popular vote with only one state in his pocket and eight
electoral votes.34
Though the Democrats decisively won the election, the results
must have seemed very troubling. Prior to this election, the party
system had not been sectional, and the election returns never
implied one section of the country was at war with the other.
Conversely, the returns of the presidential election of 1856 were
very sectional. The entire South, with the exception of Maryland,
went to Buchanan; while the North, with the exception of Illinois,
Indiana, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, went to Frémont.35
The fears expressed by so many southern politicians had come
true. The North, with its vastly superior population, had begun
to organize itself politically. If things were to continue along this
path, many southerners must have thought that the South would
be politically overshadowed by the North, ultimately ostracized
from power. The South responded in desperation, trying again to
politicize the West in its favor by installing slavery as a permanent
institution. This time, the doctrine of states’ rights was not even
used to mask the intentions of the Slave Power.
In 1858, President Buchanan was determined to bring Kansas
into the Union as a slave state. He attempted to push a bill through
Congress to admit Kansas as a state based upon the Lecompton
Constitution, a constitution written and ratified by a group of
proslavery men largely unrepresentative of the entire populace,
many of whom came from Missouri.36 This constitution stated
that the government “shall have no power to pass laws for the
emancipation of slaves without the consent of the owners,” and
it also stated that the government would have no power to block
immigrants to the state who were slaveholders.37 This attempt
represented a complete breakdown of the previous southern
rhetoric supporting states’ rights.
In the House of Representatives, William Porcher Miles, a
Democrat from South Carolina, stated forthright that the issue
of the new bill to admit Kansas as a state had nothing to do with
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popular sovereignty. He said, “The mind of the whole country
has been long distracted by this slavery agitation. It has entered
into every political question and it is impossible to disguise the
fact that it constitutes the very pith and substance of the contest in
which we are engaged.” Miles did not even seek to deny the fraud
surrounding the Lecompton Constitution; instead, he affirmed
them, even implying the coordinated efforts of slave states, led by
Missouri, to flood Kansas with proslavery men. He defended cries
of foul play from the North by stating, “The question of frauds is
a minor one.” He reasoned that the real necessity was to maintain
a political equilibrium between the South and the North.38 With
Minnesota and Oregon on the verge of being admitted as free states,
Porcher was adamant that Kansas enter the Union as a slave state to
keep the South a politically active force.39
Conversely, Alexander H. Stephens did not affirm the alleged
frauds of the Lecompton Constitution and maintained its legitimacy.
He argued that the United States Constitution was not ratified by
a popular vote, instead by a convention, thus giving legitimacy
to the proslavery convention that had ratified the Lecompton
Constitution. In making this argument, Stephens was abandoning
the past justification of popular sovereignty to reveal the expansion
of slavery to be the real agenda of the South.40
In accordance with Stephens, Trusten Polk, a Democratic
senator from Missouri, denied any corruption in the Lecompton
Constitution as well, stating that it was not necessary, given the
large number of proslavery men in Kansas. In explaining the
North’s opposition to the bill, Polk alleged that the Lecompton
Constitution’s section legalizing slavery was the only reason that
there was any controversy at all regarding the admittance of Kansas.
His argument ignored the idea of popular sovereignty in the same
manner as did Stephens.41
James M. Mason, a Democratic senator from Virginia, argued
that the North’s attempts to exclude slavery from the territories were
an effort “to prevent the expansion of political power in the South.”
His arguments did not deny any fraudulent activity, deferring
the guilt of such allegations by claiming similar frauds occurred
commonly across the country. In closing, Mason bargained the
admission of Kansas as a slave state for the admission of Minnesota
as a free state.42
The southern arguments for the admission of Kansas as a slave
state betrayed the original justification of their argument: popular
sovereignty. Both the debate over the Kansas-Nebraska Act and
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the Democratic bill to admit Kansas as a state in 1856 attempted to
put some focus on what was considered to be the popular will of
the would-be citizens of Kansas. The 1858 bill, comparatively, had
stripped itself of the façade of popular sovereignty and revealed
itself to be the South’s expansionist agenda, utilizing slavery as its
primary tool.
On the northern side of the argument, in his opening speech
before the Senate, William H. Seward, who had become a Republican,
gave no pretensions about popular sovereignty. He stated that
the conflict “involves a dynastical struggle of two antagonistical
systems, the labor of slaves and the labor of freemen, for mastery in
the Federal Union. One of these systems partakes of an aristocratic
character; the other is purely democratic.” The Slave Power, he
stated, had controlled the government from the nation’s beginning
but had begun to be replaced by the ascension of the North as a
political entity. He concluded that all civilized nations of the world
had abolished or were in the process of abolishing slavery; only
the Democratic Party still clung to the institution.43 In his closing
speech, Seward stated that the arguments in the House and Senate
had “stripped [the Democrats] bare of all pretences of fairness in
the exercise of maintaining [their] own avowed policy of popular
sovereignty. [They] will go before the people . . . in the detested
character of a party intervening for Slavery against Freedom.”44
Oliver A. Morse, a Republican congressman from New York,
affirmed the idea of the South’s former political control of the North
by stating, “It has been obvious that, for a long time, the national
power has been kept from the North, not by the proper strength of
those who kept it, but by political stratagem and management.” He
continued by adding that the North was overtaking the South in
political power and that this caused the South to worry unnecessarily;
he added, “there is no contest by the North with the South, though
the Southern people persist in assuming there is one.”45
John A. Bingham, a Republican congressman from Ohio, argued
that the forces at work behind the bill to admit Kansas as a state
under the Lecompton Constitution were organized and committed
to slavery. He stated, “The President and his party not only endorse
the Lecompton Constitution, but by argument, by entreaty, and by
threat, seek to induce Congress to endorse it, and thereby give to it
the sanction and force of law.” He continued by citing a claim by a
southern senator that his state would secede, should the bill not be
passed.46 Bingham’s arguments identify a political agenda at work
in the Democratic Party to pass the bill.
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The North’s arguments, like the South’s, were stripped of all
pretenses. They focused solely on the political nature of what
was at hand: the South’s attempt to force slavery into Kansas as a
means of keeping the South afloat in terms of political power. Their
arguments also recognized that the North was in control politically,
evidenced by the fact that the Lecompton Constitution did not pass
with the approval of Congress.
The 1850s had seen three major attempts made by the South
to use slavery to politicize the West in its favor, starting with the
Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 and followed by the Democratic bill
to admit Kansas as a state in 1856. The Democratic bill to admit
Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution in 1858 was the most
desperate and last major attempt made by the South to push
slavery westward to increase the national influence of the Slave
Power. By the time of the Lecompton Constitution, the South’s
political dominance had been usurped by the North, which had
organized under the Republican Party in response to the South’s
apparent political prowess and control. It was the South’s failure
to maintain its political superiority in the 1850s that led to a
Republican presidential victory in 1860 and the resulting secession
of a majority of the southern states, which triggered the Civil War.
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